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Abstract: My main aim in this paper is to clarify the concepts of referential success and of 
referential continuity that are so crucial to the scientific realism debate. I start by considering the 
three dominant theories of reference and the intuitions that motivate each of them. Since several 
intuitions cited in support of one theory conflict with intuitions cited in support of another 
something has to give way. The traditional policy has been to reject all intuitions that clash with a 
chosen theory. A more radical policy, tied to some experimental philosophers, has called for the 
rejection of any evidential role for intuitions. I explore a largely ignored third alternative, i.e. 
saving intuitions (and their evidential role) even when they are at odds. To accommodate 
conflicting intuitions different sets of internally consistent (yet externally inconsistent) intuitions 
are taken to lend credence to different concepts of reference. In the current context, this means 
that the concepts of referential success and referential continuity are not monolithic. They are 
what I call ‘polylithic’. This paper is as much about meta-philosophical concerns with the role of 
intuitions as it is about reference and the scientific realism debate. Regarding the former I hope 
that a blueprint will emerge for similar projects in other philosophical domains. Regarding the 
latter, I hope that polylithicity helps disentangle claims about referential success and continuity in 
the scientific realism debate by making perspicuous which concepts are best equipped to evaluate 
the realist’s epistemic claims against the historical record of science. 
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Saving the Intuitions: Polylithic Reference 
 
Ioannis Votsis (University of Duesseldorf) 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Most scientific realists nowadays would endorse an argument like the following: The empirical 
and explanatory success of theories or theory-parts is a good indicator of their approximate truth. 
In turn, approximate truth is a good indicator of referential success.1 Successor theories typically 
preserve all of the empirical and explanatory success of their predecessors as well as add to it. 
They are thus in general strictly more approximately true than their predecessors. Moreover, by 
preserving their predecessors’ approximately true parts they preserve any referential success the 
predecessors enjoy. This implies that successor theories that are more approximately true than 
their predecessors are typically also referentially continuous with them. 
An evaluation of these claims requires a clear grasp of the concepts involved. My aim in this 
paper is to clarify the concepts of referential success and of referential continuity. I start by 
considering the three dominant theories of reference, namely descriptivist, causal-historical and 
causal-descriptivist theories, and the intuitions that motivate each of them. Since several 
intuitions cited in support of one theory conflict with intuitions cited in support of another 
something has to give way. Two policies have thus far proved popular. The traditional policy has 
been to reject all intuitions that clash with a chosen theory. A more radical policy, tied to some 
experimental philosophers, has called for the rejection of any evidential role for intuitions. I 
explore a largely ignored third alternative, i.e. saving intuitions (and their evidential role) even 
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when they are at odds. To accommodate conflicting intuitions I perform a compartmentalisation 
manoeuvre whereby different sets of internally consistent (yet externally inconsistent) intuitions 
lend credence to different concepts of reference. I argue that so long as we identify which concept 
is employed in which circumstances, some disputes about reference disappear. What is more, I 
illustrate how different concepts can be used to make sense of the historical record of science and 
to evaluate scientific realist claims.  
A few stage-setting remarks are in order. First, most discussions of reference concern 
everyday language term reference and in particular the reference of proper names.  Even though I 
will be drawing substantially on these discussions, as many other philosophers of science have 
done and continue to do, my primary focus will be on scientific term reference. By and large, 
material presented prior to section six concerns both ordinary term as well as scientific term 
reference. Second, I do not intend to offer a comprehensive survey of theories of reference. I 
merely wish to concentrate on the most prominent versions as well as the most conspicuous 
supporting and opposing intuitions. Third, I do not intend to defend a fully developed view of the 
nature of intuitions. Instead, the various intuitions presented in this paper are expressed so as to 
conform to three desiderata: (i) they ought to reflect the internally uniform practices of different 
groups of competent language users, (ii) they ought to avoid philosophically loaded terms and (iii) 
they ought to be rationally evaluable. To comply with the first desideratum I attempt to narrow in 
on those intuitions members of a group who make similar judgments with respect to the 
application of a given concept have in common. To comply with the second desideratum I 
obviate philosophically loaded terms like ‘reference’ and ‘object’ in favour of more neutral terms 
like ‘talking about’ and ‘thing’. To comply with the third desideratum I present the relevant 
intuitions in propositional form. Although in their natural state most intuitions are probably too 
obscure to possess a propositional form, we can reasonably reconstruct whatever is propositional 
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about them or at least whatever propositions they are meant to prop up. The intuitions presented 
below are thus not necessarily actual intuitions but they are at least sensible proxies. Fourth, I 
only offer a rather small sample of the available intuitions. Fifth, it is worth keeping in mind that 
there is always some evidential distance between actual intuitions and philosophical theories. At 
best actual intuitions inductively support the intuitions as I reformulate them and they in turn 
inductively support the coveted philosophical theories.  
 
2. Descriptivism 
 
The core idea in descriptivist theories is that reference is fixed by virtue of a term’s associated 
descriptions. Notable proponents include Frege (1892/1997), Russell (1905) and Searle (1958).2 
Let us start with a rather simplistic formulation that perhaps nobody ever advocated:  
 
Def. 1: A term t refers to an entity a if and only if a satisfies all the descriptive claims associated 
with t.3 
 
Since the first definition applies only to object terms, we need another one for predicates: 
 
Def. 2: A term t refers to a property X if and only if any object with property X satisfies all the 
descriptive claims associated with t.4,5 
 
For expediency let us hereafter forgo separate definitions for object and predicate terms, unifying 
the two as follows: 
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Def. 3: A term t refers to a(n) entity a (/property X) if and only if a (/any object with property X) 
satisfies all the descriptive claims associated with t. 
 
Descriptivism is in tune with a number of widespread intuitions about reference. One such 
intuition the theory (as it is presented above) is meant to draw support from and hence satisfy is 
the following: 
 
(a) To successfully talk about a thing requires that all of our ideas about it hold.  
 
There is a certain naturalness to (a) since we sometimes tend to associate successful talk about an 
object with our ability to correctly attribute properties and relations to it that it does indeed 
possess. Suppose I am attempting to refer to Flavio, one of my niece’s cats. Were I to mistakenly 
describe Flavio as white with brownish spots, my niece would protest that I am not talking about 
Flavio. The suitability of my niece’s judgment can be maintained even when all my other Flavio-
attributions are true. After all, she believes that one incorrect attribution is sufficient to foil the 
proper identification of her cat. 
A related intuition that the above descriptivist theory is meant to satisfy can likewise be 
illustrated via the disagreement between interlocutors. The difference is that this time the focus is 
not on the incorrectness of one interlocutor’s attribution but rather the mere disagreement itself:  
 
(b) If yours and my ideas about some thing are not in agreement then we are not talking about 
exactly the same thing. 
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Who hasn’t been in a situation where a discrepancy in the descriptions used by two or more 
speakers elicits the remark ‘They are surely not talking about the same thing!’.6  
Intuitions (a) and (b) are congenial to, though not exclusively associated with, the further 
intuition: 
 
(c) No idea a person may have fails to be about some thing. 
 
Essentially this means that every description corresponds to some object. Though radical 
sounding at first, there is certainly a sense in which (c) reflects some folk usage. Competent 
language users often attribute thinghood merely on a stipulative basis. For example, people talk 
about counterfactual things like the child two celebrities would have were they to reproduce and 
even talk about impossible things like the round square. Thus at least some speakers are willing 
to be maximally charitable in their ascription of referents. Of course, that’s not to say that 
competent language speakers have the same ontic and epistemic commitments to such things as 
they do to real things. 
Let us turn now our attention to three related problems. The first problem is that descriptivist 
theories are too demanding. Lakatos once famously pointed out that scientific theories are born 
refuted (1978, 5). In the current discussion that translates as the assertion that at least some of the 
descriptions associated with scientific terms are false. For descriptivists who maintain that 
successful reference requires the satisfaction of all associated descriptions this means that no 
scientific term refers.7 By modus tollens such a descriptivist view, branded by its critics as ‘naïve 
descriptivism’, is patently false if one believes, as most realists do, that at least some scientific 
terms refer.  
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One obvious reply that has been proposed is to lower the requirements of successful 
reference. Here’s a generic account of a modified descriptivist theory:  
 
Def. 4: A term t refers to a(n) entity a (/property X) if and only if a (/any object with property X) 
satisfies a certain special subset of the descriptions associated with t. 
 
This definition immediately gives rise to another problem. I call this second problem the ‘ntity-
lity problem’, for it concerns the qua-ntity and qua-lity of the descriptions involved. How many 
and/or which descriptions are enough? Otherwise put, how do we define the special subset of 
descriptions required to establish reference? 
That all of our ideas about a thing hold does not always mean that they are sufficient to 
uniquely identify it. We may call this a case of ‘underdetermination’. Two mutually exclusive 
options are available. Either we deem unique identification necessary for successful reference or 
else we deem it unnecessary. The converse condition, i.e. overdetermination, not only occurs but 
quite a few philosophers would argue it is the norm. It happens when a proper subset of our true 
ideas about a thing appears to be sufficient to uniquely identify it. We also face a dilemma here. 
Either we deem that unique identification is sufficient for reference or else we deem it 
insufficient. 
Some proposals have been (or can be) put forth to tackle the second problem. For example, 
Searle (ibid.) proposes a cluster view of proper names, according to which a name refers when “a 
sufficient but so far unspecified number of [descriptions] are true of [the given] object” (171). 
Another proposal seeks to identify the special subset with those descriptions of the objects or 
properties that arise in the context of a mature science or theory. A related proposal appeals to 
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essential or natural kind properties. The thought here is that some descriptions are more critical 
than others in determining the essence or nature of a particular object or property. 
This brings us to the third problem which questions whether we have independent reasons to 
accept each of the proposed solutions to the second problem. That is, it asks if the conditions 
suggested to identify the special subset of descriptions are ad hoc. Take, for example, the cluster 
view proposal. If one of our aims is to find a theory of reference that does not require all the 
associated descriptions to be satisfied, merely codifying this aim in a view that denies naïve 
descriptivism is not satisfactory. Independent reasons are required for the adoption of the cluster 
view and such reasons would have to answer, among other things, why it is that some sets of 
descriptions are sufficient to fix reference. 
In spite of these obstacles, there is no a-priori reason why a sophisticated descriptivist 
account could not possibly do justice to the ntity-lity problem without falling prey to the problem 
of ad-hocness. Any such account would presumably be motivated by some suitably modified 
version of intuitions (a)-(c). Having said this, there are intuitions that, at least prima facie, seem 
incongruent with all descriptivist theories. It is to such intuitions we next turn towards and in 
particular to those that support the causal-historical theory of reference. 
 
3. Causal-Historicism 
 
The underlying idea in causal-historicism is that reference is fixed via a term’s causal history. 
The view was famously proposed by Kripke (1972/1981) and developed further by Putnam 
(1975). It has since acquired a great number of supporters including Boyd (1993) and Devitt 
(1990). Consider the following generic formulation:  
 
 9 
 
Def. 5: A term t refers to a(n) entity a (/property X) if and only if t was used to originally dub a 
(/X) after some causal contact with a (/X) or samples of a (/instantiations of X) and any speaker’s 
subsequent use of t is causally linked back to the original dubbing. 
 
The causal component plays a dual role. First, it requires that the speaker who initially 
baptised the entity or property have causal contact with it. For example, the baptiser must have 
interacted with or at least observed the given entity or property. Second, any speaker who 
subsequently employs that term to successfully refer must, however indirectly, be causally 
connected to the baptiser. In other words, such speakers learnt to use the term from causal contact 
with others who used it in the same way in a historical line that stretches back to the baptiser. 
Consider the kinds of intuitions the causal-historical view is intended to draw support from. 
 
(d) Successful talk about a thing can occur even when all of our ideas about it do not hold.  
 
One camp’s intuitions in favour are the other camp’s intuitions against. Intuition (d) contradicts 
intuition (a). Even before the first explicit formulation of a causal-historical theory, philosophers 
of language were keen to point out cases where successful reference does not require correct 
descriptive content. Donnellan (1966, 364-365) uses the example of a person at a party who 
inquires about ‘the man drinking a martini’. The definite description is successfully used 
referentially, according to Donnellan, even though the person is drinking water rather than a 
martini. 
 
(e) Two or more people may talk about the same thing even if they have conflicting ideas about it. 
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This intuition contradicts intuition (b). Think of Donnellan’s example again but suppose now that 
even though the discussants all have conflicting ideas about the man drinking water at the party, 
they successfully identify, and refer to, him via ostension. Notice that for this intuition to hold it 
need not be the case that there is at least one individual whose ideas are correct, i.e. they could all 
be mistaken. 
At this point one might expect the formulation of an intuition that contradicts (c). Yet causal 
theorists can take (c) on board. So long as causal contact determines reference it does not matter 
whether descriptions always correspond to some object, real or fictional. That being said, what 
we need is an intuition to underwrite the causal component of the theory. 
 
(f) To talk about some thing typically requires some sort of direct contact or at least indirect 
contact – i.e. contact with a person who has direct contact or who belongs in a chain of persons 
whose last link at least has direct contact – with that thing.8 
 
Consider an example. The term ‘berkelium’ denotes a radioactive metallic element with atomic 
number 97. The person who presumably dubbed it, its discoverer and Nobel laureate Glenn T. 
Seaborg, arguably had some causal contact with berkelium since he headed the cyclotron 
experiments that synthesised the element by bombarding americium with alpha particles. It seems 
right then to say that when Seaborg employed the term ‘berkelium’ he successfully referred to the 
element berkelium. A nuclear chemist who does not have access to a sample of berkelium can 
still correctly refer to the substance or instances of the substance by borrowing the term from 
others who do have some causal contact with a sample.9 Finally, it seems correct to hold that 
someone who merely happens to utter the term ‘berkelium’ without prior direct or indirect 
contact cannot be successfully referring to the substance or any of its instances. 
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Like descriptivists, causal theorists come up against several problems. We can again identify 
three related and widely discussed ones. The first problem is that the causal theory is too liberal. 
It allows any old term to refer to some entity or property. The typical example given is that of the 
notion of dephlogisticated air. Nowadays we do not believe in the existence of phlogiston but 
since scientists in the eighteenth century used the term ‘dephlogisticated air’ in virtually all the 
cases where causal contact with oxygen was made, the causal theorist is forced to claim that 
‘dephlogisticated air’ was in fact referring to oxygen all along.10  For many philosophers of 
science these reconstructions of history are a bitter pill that they do not consider sensible to 
swallow. 
To pre-empt such objections Putnam (1978) introduced the principle of the benefit of doubt. 
If the descriptions associated with an old theoretical term do not diverge unreasonably from those 
of its modern day counterpart, the principle allows us to brand the old theoretical term referential. 
That descriptions were not entirely absent from causal-historical theories is something that has 
largely been missed by commentators. Kripke (1972/1981, 79) made it clear that the dubbing 
event may include descriptions and that it may even be solely based on them. In support of the 
latter scenario he offered the celebrated discovery of Neptune. Initially scientists had no ostensive 
(causal) contact with Neptune but fixed its reference merely on the basis of theoretical 
calculations, i.e. on the basis of descriptions. 
If we allow descriptions to creep in then we again come face to face with the ntity-lity 
problem. This marks the second problem for the causal-historical theory. It is worth noting that 
the principle of the benefit of doubt is tactically identical to the modified versions of 
descriptivism discussed earlier. It aims to find the right balance between requiring that all 
descriptions must be satisfied and that none of them need to. In this respect, one may understand 
causal-historical theories as augmented descriptivist theories. The crucial question once more is 
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when are we justifiably charitable? Unless some guidance is given opinions are likely to vary. 
Indeed, some philosophers have complained that the principle of charity trivialises the notions of 
referential success and continuity (e.g. Worrall 1994). 
The causal theorists’ answers to the ntity-lity problem mirror those given by the 
descriptivists, e.g. appeal is made to essential or natural kind properties, etc. For this reason, ad-
hocness worries arise here also. This marks the third problem for the causal-historical theory. 
Independent reasons are required to warrant the application of the principle of the benefit of 
doubt, reasons that make it clear why in a given context it diagnoses referential success or failure, 
referential continuity or discontinuity. As with descriptivist theories, it is worth reminding that 
the obstacles cited above do not constitute an a-priori reason against a sophisticated causal-
historical account. 
 
4. Causal-Descriptivism 
 
As its name suggests, causal-descriptivism aims to fix reference by appealing to a combined 
strategy. The view can be traced back to Evans (1973). Other notable proponents include Lewis 
(1984), Kroon (1987) and Nola (1980). Evans takes reference to be fixed by the dominant (causal) 
source of the speaker’s descriptions. Take the term ‘aeroplane’. Since the main causal source of 
the descriptions we associate with this term, e.g. ‘has a jet or a propeller engine’, ‘flies’, etc., is 
aeroplanes, the term refers to aeroplanes. Expressed formally a causal-descriptivist theory might 
look something like this:  
 
Def. 6: A term t refers to a(n) entity a (/property X) if and only if the dominant (causal) source of 
any descriptive content associated with t is a (/X).  
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Following descriptivist theories, the causal-descriptivist view complies with the general 
intuition that descriptions are necessary and sufficient for successful reference. Following causal-
historical theories, the view satisfies the general intuition that causation is a necessary component 
of reference fixing. That descriptions are necessary and sufficient for successful reference can be 
reconciled with the idea that causation is a necessary component by pointing out that the latter 
acts as a filter on the former. If you like, we determine the special subset of descriptions by 
appeal to those descriptions that encode what is causally relevant.  
An instructive example from Evans about ordinary term reference will help make clear how 
a causal-descriptivist theory is supposed to function. Suppose we discover an urn which contains 
various mathematical proofs. Since the urn is inscribed with the name ‘Ibn Khan’, it is widely 
assumed thereafter that credit for the proofs goes to the person with that name. Suppose further 
that Ibn Kahn was merely the person who transcribed the proofs many years after their creation. 
What does the term ‘Ibn Kahn’ refer to? The scribe? The mathematician who constructed the 
proofs? A fictional person? No person whatsoever? The descriptive theory of reference might 
rule in favour of any of these answers depending on what its advocates take to be the special 
subset of descriptions that needs to be satisfied. In the case of the causal-theory of reference the 
situation is also fuzzy. For example, if the initial baptism and subsequent usage have already 
established a consensus amongst the ancients that ‘Ibn Kahn’ denotes the scribe then the causal-
theorist will be obligated to follow suit. If, on the other hand, a more refined causal theorist 
insists that a new baptism takes place upon the urn’s modern-day discovery, then the term ‘Ibn 
Khan’ as it is used by members of the mathematical community today denotes the author of those 
proofs. In Evans’ view, modern-day mathematicians never intended to refer to the scribe but 
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rather to the author of the proofs. After all, the author is the ‘dominant causal origin’ of the most 
relevant description associated with the name, i.e. ‘the person who constructed the proofs’. 
The causal component plays a different role here than it does in causal-historical theories. 
Whereas in those theories the causal component relates the baptiser (and the baptism term) to the 
referent as well as to subsequent users, in causal-descriptivist theories the causal component 
relates the descriptive content to the referent. To complicate matters even further, in some 
theories the causal component plays yet another role. For example, in Stathis Psillos’ causal-
descriptivist theory that we shall shortly be examining the term ‘causal’ qualifies the properties 
the relevant descriptions are about. In other words, Psillos’ theory focuses on descriptions of 
causal properties as opposed to Evans’ which focuses on the main causal source of a set of 
descriptions. 
Let us put together a couple of potential intuitions some causal-descriptivist theories are 
intended to satisfy: 
 
(g) To successfully talk about a thing requires that our ideas primarily originate from contact with 
that thing. 
 
(h) Two or more people may talk about the same thing so long as any non-conflicting ideas they 
have primarily originate from contact with that thing. 
 
Just like intuitions (a)-(f), (g) and (h) can be sharpened so as to reflect a whole range of 
intricacies that their advocates would like to incorporate. 
For obvious reasons, the ntity-lity and ad-hocness problems make their appearance here also. 
Instead of hammering the same nail again, I will instead consider some difficulties with Psillos’ 
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version of the causal-descriptivist theory, which is tailor-made for the scientific realism debate. 
He explains his view as follows: “A term t refers to an entity x if and only if x satisfies the core 
causal description associated with t” (1999, 296). The core causal description associated with a 
term is the description of “the [kind-constitutive] properties by virtue of which it [i.e. a posited 
entity] plays its causal role vis-à-vis the [relevant] set of phenomena” (295). What are kind-
constitutive properties?  They “are those whose presence in an item makes that item belong to a 
kind” (288). In order to make explicit the role of his theory in adjudicating referential disputes in 
the scientific realism debate, Psillos introduces a notion of referential continuity which he takes 
to piggy-bag on his notion of successful reference: 
 
Two terms t’ and t denote the same entity if and only if [i] their putative referents play the 
same causal role with respect to a network of phenomena; and [ii] the core causal description 
of t’ takes up the kind-constitutive properties of the core causal description association with t 
(1999, 296). 
 
In other words, for two successive terms to refer to the same entity, the historically later term 
must inherit the core causal description associated with the historically former term and the two 
must concern the same domain of phenomena. Psillos cites the term ‘ether’ as one of several 
examples that fit his approach. He takes users of the term ‘ether’ in the nineteenth century to be 
successfully referring to the electromagnetic field. 
Several problems afflict Psillos’ theory. The first problem concerns Psillos’ two definitions, 
which, as it turns out, are inconsistent. Consider the following example. Suppose that James 
Ladyman, the philosopher of science, has two kind-constitutive properties, creature with a gentle 
spirit and creature with a fist of steel. Suppose further that we have two successive theories about 
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James with terms t and t´ respectively. The core causal description associated with term t´ 
contains only ‘creature with a gentle spirit’ and the core causal description associated with term t 
contains only ‘creature with a fist of steel’. Now according to the definition of successful 
reference both t´ and t refer to James, as it seems they should. However, according to the 
definition of referential continuity t´ and t cannot both be referring to James since t´ does not take 
up the kind-constitutive properties of the core causal description associated with t. The problem 
stems from the fact that in his attempt to formulate a notion of referential continuity Psillos 
inadvertently redefines the notion of referential success by stating conditions under which terms 
denote an entity. 
Psillos brings up a second serious objection to his theory when he says “But, an objector may 
ask, how (and when) is the core description to be singled out?” (297). I take this to be tantamount 
to the ntity-lity problem. Psillos attempts to dismiss the problem by reiterating what many other 
causal and causal-descriptivist theorists have said before him, namely that “some descriptions 
associated with a term are less fundamental in view of the fact that the posited entity would play 
its intended causal role even if they were not true” (ibid.). Though a sensible thing to say, it still 
doesn’t give us a non-ad hoc and unambiguous way to determine the fundamental from the non-
fundamental descriptions. We might, for instance, contest Psillos’ account of the ether’s core 
causal description, by arguing that several of its fundamental properties, e.g. that ether molecules 
oscillate and that transverse waves require a solid medium, were not taken up by the mature 
electromagnetic field’s core causal description (Stanford 2003).  
As with the other theories of reference, I am not arguing here that Psillos’ theory or causal-
descriptivist theories in general are a lost cause, unamenable to successful modification. I am 
simply pointing out some of their limitations as well as the intuitions they are meant to satisfy. 
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5. Saving the Intuitions 
 
The realisation that various intuitions are conflicting leads to the following trilemma: Either we 
(1) identify one set of internally consistent intuitions that we take to count as evidence for one 
theory of reference or (2) reject any evidential role for intuitions or (3) maintain that a number of 
internally consistent (but externally inconsistent) sets of intuitions count as evidence for their 
respective theories and corresponding concepts. The first option is taken up by the majority of 
supporters of the above three theories. Each group of supporters deem their own intuitions to be 
superior and on that basis discard the other theories and their associated intuitions.11 The second 
option is a relatively recent development in meta-philosophical discussions about methodology. 
Some naturalists and experimental philosophers (e.g. Cummins 1999) have rejected the practice 
of employing intuitions to justify philosophical theories. According to them, only empirical 
evidence is equipped for that job. I aim to explore the third option, namely that each set of 
internally consistent intuitions lends credence to a different concept. In the current context, this 
means that the concepts of referential success and referential continuity are not monolithic. They 
are what I call ‘polylithic’.  
Are there really so many concepts in use? To answer this question we must first ask if there 
are many intuitions in use. On the basis of the available empirical evidence (e.g. Machery et al. 
2004), there seems to be a prima facie strong case for the relative multiplicity of intuitions. These 
may vary from culture to culture, from individual to individual and even from time to time in the 
same individual. If intuitions genuinely guide at least some of our referential judgements then 
they strongly suggest that our linguistic practices are peppered with a plethora of referential 
concepts.12 The upshot of adopting the third option in the trilemma is therefore a more accurate 
portrayal of these practices. One and the same term is often used at least somewhat differently by 
 18 
 
different individuals and may even be used differently by the same individual over time. Unless 
we opt to eliminate all conflicting uses as incorrect applications of one and the same concept, it is 
reasonable to assume that there are numerous concepts at play. Such concepts are not unrelated 
since their extension tends to overlap significantly. Think of the three theories of reference and 
the corresponding concepts they propose. Their rulings on referential success diverge only on the 
fringe cases. This is not surprising since they all aim to incorporate as large a catalogue of 
common-sense cases of referential success and failure as possible. Indeed we can explain why 
communication does not constantly break down precisely because of the substantial extensional 
overlap these concepts tend to enjoy. Conversely we can explain the relatively few occasions 
when it does break down by pointing out those elements of their extensions that do not coincide.  
Ought there be a plurality of referential concepts? Yes, but that does not invite a free-for-all! 
Linguistic practice reveals several different concepts, standards of concept application and 
intuitions but not all of them are worth considering. We at least want to weed out those that fail to 
meet minimal logical and/or rationality criteria. Conversely, we need to plumb for concepts, 
standards of concept application and intuitions that have hitherto remained undetected. Some of 
them will be the product of scientific cultivation. For example, a modern-day physicist’s 
intuitions about space and time will be very different from those of a physicist living in the 
nineteenth century.13 In short, we want our concepts to exhibit the ‘best’ current practices but also 
the practices that best extend the current ones. Acknowledging a plurality of concepts does not 
mean that certain concepts are not more natural or better suited than others for particular tasks. In 
the context of the scientific realism debate certain notions of referential success and continuity 
will turn out to be much more useful than others. For instance, referential continuity concepts 
will need to be sufficiently stringent so as to not trivialise continuity and sufficiently supple so as 
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to not preclude the possibility of continuity. So long as we are aware which concepts are used 
under what circumstances, we will be able to solve and even dissolve various disputes.  
A word of caution before we proceed to the next section. Each option in the trilemma is not 
as insular as I have hitherto portrayed. The first option is not only available to traditional 
supporters of the three theories of reference who primarily employ conceptual analysis to practice 
their trade. It is also available to moderate experimental philosophers and naturalists who resist 
the temptation to reject the evidential role of intuitions. Instead such philosophers argue that we 
should vet intuitions on the basis of experimental studies (see, for example, Nahmias et. al. 
2005).14 The second option can also be unraveled in different ways. For example, those who deny 
that intuitions play any evidential role can choose between a monolithic and a polylithic 
understanding of concepts. The only difference between a second-option polylithist and a third-
option polylithist is the way each motivates their polylithism – in the one case without an appeal 
to intuitions and in the other with such an appeal. Finally, the third option is compatible with both 
moderate experimental and non-experimental approaches to philosophy. What is more, one may 
choose between saving all concepts and intuitions and weeding out some as undesirable – I have 
suggested that the latter option is more prudent. What matters most to those who advocate the 
third option is that inconsistent intuitions are compartmentalised into separate internally 
consistent sets each of which is evidentially relevant to a different concept. 
 
6. Polylithic Reference15 
 
In this section I illustrate how different concepts of referential success and continuity can be used 
to make sense of the historical record of science and to evaluate scientific realist claims. I will not 
present an exhaustive list of reference concepts that competent language users possess or would 
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benefit from possessing. There are simply too many such concepts so I will restrict my attention 
to a selected few. For the same reasons, I will not attempt to catalogue all the reference concepts 
that are significant for scientific realism. I will, however, explore at least one concept whose 
satisfaction demands are in sync with the epistemic claims current scientific realists make. 
Finally, I will not test the concepts below against possible counterexamples or against long-
standing problems like ntity-lity and ad-hocness. Rather I will try to indicate the usefulness of 
having different concepts of reference in sorting out some disputes in the scientific realism debate. 
 
We start with a notion of reference that is particularly undemanding.  
 
Def. 7: A scientific term t refers(MN) to a real entity a (/property X) if and only if t is used to 
consistently identify a (/X) or at least to consistently identify the causal source of phenomena 
associated with a (/X), either via a potentially truthful description or via some actual contact with 
the source.16 
 
The motivation for this notion of reference is that it saves some versions of the aforesaid 
intuitions, e.g. not neglecting causal contact and successfully talking about an object that we have 
merely attempted to describe. Let us also define a corollary notion of referential continuity 
refcont(MN) derivatively:  
 
Def. 8: Two terms t and t′ are refcont(MN) if and only if they refer(MN) to the same entity or 
property. 
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The two definitions are strikingly easy to satisfy. To illustrate this, consider the following 
example. Aristotle’s expression ‘tending towards its natural place’ refers(MN) to gravity for its 
corresponding notion was postulated to explain, among other things, phenomena relating to 
falling objects.17 The mere attempt to describe such phenomena is sufficient for reference(MN) 
but so is the causal contact Aristotle and his contemporaries had with falling objects. Apples fell 
then just as they did during Newton’s time and continue to do so today. Since such phenomena 
are associated with our modern understanding of gravity, the expression ‘tending towards its 
natural place’ is refcont(MN) with the expression ‘gravity as spacetime curvature’ (for a 
congenial account, albeit one that’s used for different purposes, see Friedman 2001). Most, if not 
all, scientific realists would consider this kind of referential continuity extremely feeble since 
Aristotle and his supporters had nothing in mind that is remotely similar to the general theory of 
relativity. Nonetheless, Aristotle, Einstein and supporters of their theories certainly share an 
interest in explaining phenomena relating to gravity and in this minimal respect the two 
expressions and the corresponding theories are continuous. 
That the two definitions are so easy to satisfy does not mean that they are trivially satisfiable. 
To see this consider a case of referential failure. The term ‘celestial sphere’ does not refer(MN) to 
gluon particles. The celestial spheres were postulated to explain celestial phenomena like the 
daily motion of the ‘fixed’ stars but not the kind of phenomena we associate with gluons, namely 
that they mediate strong (colour) interactions between quarks, bind protons and neutrons in 
atomic nuclei, etc. A fortiori, we can say that the term ‘celestial sphere’ is not refcont(MN) with 
the term ‘gluon’. Note also that there are contexts where refer(MN) is more difficult to satisfy 
than the naïve descriptivist theory that underwrites intuition (c) since the former prohibits 
reference to non-real objects. 
Let us step up the satisfaction demands.  
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Def. 9: A scientific term t refers(TD) to a real entity a (/property X) if and only if (i) t is used to 
consistently identify a (/X) or at least to consistently identify the causal source of phenomena 
associated with a (/X) and (ii) some of the (non-trivial) theoretical descriptive claims associated 
with t are true of a (/X).  
 
This notion of reference saves intuitions about not neglecting causal contact and about 
successfully talking about an object despite having some false associated ideas. It also saves more 
philosophically refined intuitions like the demand for the satisfaction of one or more theoretical 
descriptions. As before we define a corollary notion of referential continuity derivatively:  
 
Def. 10: Two successive scientific terms t and t′ are refcont(TD) if and only if they refer(TD) to 
the same entity or property.  
 
Henceforth t′ is the successor term and t the predecessor. 
Obviously this notion is harder to satisfy. Terms that satisfy it enjoy a thicker kind of 
referential continuity that is capable of tackling some of the historical objections faced by the 
realist. It is so capable because it demands that part of the old theory about the object must be 
correct. Consider an example of referential success and referential continuity. The term ‘caloric’ 
in the early nineteenth century refers(TD) to, and is refcont(TD) with, heat as it is understood in 
classical and statistical thermodynamics. This is the case because certain of the theoretical 
descriptions associated with the term ‘caloric’, e.g. Sadi Carnot’s principle of maximum 
efficiency, are still thought to be true of heat systems today.18 The gravity example given earlier 
now serves as an example of referential failure and referential discontinuity. The expression 
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‘tending towards its natural place’ neither refers(TD) to gravity nor is refcont(TD) with the 
expression ‘gravity as spacetime curvature’ since it not associated with any (non-trivial) 
theoretical descriptive claims that are true of gravity. 
There is a stronger sense of continuity that scientists and scientific realists aspire towards. It 
occurs when a successor theory’s term inherits all of the non-trivially true theoretical and 
empirical descriptions that the predecessor theory associated with a corresponding term. This is 
roughly the kind of continuity that Psillos’ causal-descriptivism attempted to secure. Let us 
encapsulate the desired continuity semi-derivatively as follows:  
 
Def. 11: Two successive scientific terms t and t′ are refcont(TD)* if and only if (i) they refer(TD) 
to the same entity a (/property X) and (ii) t′ inherits all of the (non-trivial) theoretical and 
empirical descriptive claims true of a (/X) that are associated with t.  
 
In effect, refcont(TD)* requires that those parts of a predecessor theory that are true of some 
object or property be preserved in the successor theory. 19  This bodes well with the lofty 
requirements current scientific realists place on a theory of reference. If, as was argued in the first 
paragraph of this paper, a successor theory is to be strictly more approximately true than a 
predecessor then all of the latter’s true theoretical and empirical descriptive claims (including 
those relating to a particular term t) must be preserved in the successor theory. Take the earlier 
‘caloric’ example. The term ‘caloric’ is arguably refcont(TD)* with heat as it is understood in 
classical and statistical thermodynamics since Carnot’s principle of maximum efficiency, among 
other true theoretical and empirical descriptive claims, is preserved in those accounts in the form 
of the second law of thermodynamics. 
Finally let us look at a notion whose satisfaction demands are perhaps impossibly high.  
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Def. 12: A scientific term t refers(MX) to a real entity a (/property X) if and only if (i) t is used to 
consistently identify a (/X) and (ii) all and only the theoretical and empirical descriptive claims 
associated with t are true of a (/X).  
 
Most probably no scientific term qualifies as referentially successful under these conditions. 
Nonetheless the notion saves exaggeratedly optimistic intuitions we might have about the 
indispensability of causal contact and about the virtues of acquiring all and only true descriptions 
of an object. Since referential continuity is understood as involving progress and terms satisfying 
refer(MX) cannot progress further, i.e. they cannot be associated with any more truths about their 
target objects, a suitable definition of refcont(MX) must require only that t′ refers(MX). The 
remaining conditions for such a definition can vary according to the desired strength. Here’s a 
sufficiently strong formulation of refcont(MX):  
 
Def. 13: Two successive scientific terms t and t′ are refcont(MX)* if and only if (i) t′ refers(MX) 
to a (/X), (ii) t nearly refers(MX) a (/X) and (iii) t′ inherits all of the (non-trivial) theoretical and 
empirical descriptive claims true of a (/X) that are associated with t.  
 
The strength of the notion refcont(MX)* obviously depends in part on the strength of the notion 
‘nearly refers(MX)’.  
The concepts discussed above are only showroom examples of the kinds of concepts that are 
required to satisfy the remarkable variety of intuitions. Refer(MN) and refer(MX) are intended to 
represent two extremes – not the only extreme ones – of the spectrum of noteworthy referential 
concepts. Naturally, many concepts with varying degrees of satisfaction demands fall in between. 
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Most versions of the three dominant theories of reference as well as refer(TD) are amongst them. 
Refer(TD) is intended to represent the kind of concept that current scientific realists need in order 
to ascertain their epistemic claims. These claims can be tested against how well the historical 
record of science fits sufficiently demanding notions of reference and referential continuity. The 
stronger the epistemic claims a scientific realist makes the higher the satisfaction demands that 
need to be met. Otherwise put, the thicker the referential continuity established, the stronger the 
case for scientific realism.  
The current paper sticks its neck out by making the following testable prediction: Other 
things being equal, the more empirically successful a particular theory becomes the more likely it 
is that its successor theories will satisfy increasingly stronger notions of referential success and 
continuity. Future scientific realists will probably need referential concepts stronger than 
refer(TD) and refcont(TD)* to ascertain their own particular epistemic claims since their 
challenges will presumably be more sophisticated – that is they will have higher satisfaction 
demands. 
At this point readers might be unclear why we need a multitude of referential concepts if 
only one is required to test scientific realism against its opponents. There are at least two reasons 
for this. The first reason concerns the diachronic character of the debate. Since scientific realists 
and their opponents adapt their epistemic claims over time the requisite referential concepts adapt 
with them. That already implies a multiplicity of referential concepts each tied to a different set 
of satisfaction demands. The second reason concerns the synchronic character of the debate. Even 
from the perspective of a set of fixed challenges to scientific realism, theories and their posits can 
be referentially successful and continuous in different ways. So long as we are clear about what 
kind of success and continuity is at stake, we can avoid a lot of unnecessary disputes about 
reference. Labelling each kind with a unique concept allows us to do just that. As we saw earlier, 
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we need not deny that Aristotle’s expression ‘tending towards its natural place’ is referentially 
continuous to Einstein’s ‘gravity as spacetime curvature’ in some sense, e.g. refcont(MN), to 
accept that it is referentially discontinuous in others, e.g. refcont(TD). 
I would like to end this section by bringing to light one more complication. Following 
convention, I have up to now spoken about referential continuity as a one-one relation. That is 
not strictly speaking always the case. Sometimes two or more predecessor notions are replaced by 
a single successor notion. For example, both Kepler’s notion of planetary motion and Galileo’s 
notion of a freely falling body get replaced by Newton’s notion of force. Sometimes the converse 
happens. A single predecessor notion is replaced by two or more successor ones. For example, 
the classical notion of kinetic energy is replaced by the quantum mechanical notion for sub-
atomic objects and the relativistic notion for all other objects. This complexity needs to be 
reflected in our formulations of referential continuity concepts if they are to be fair to the 
historical record of science. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
This paper was as much about meta-philosophical concerns with the role of intuitions as it was 
about theories of reference and the scientific realism debate. Regarding the former I hope that a 
blueprint has emerged for similar projects in other philosophical domains. Regarding the latter, I 
hope to have provided compelling reasons why an account of multiple referential concepts does 
justice to the motley of linguistic practices by providing a framework within which each practice 
and the intuitions that underlie it tallies with a different concept. Ultimately, I hope that such an 
account helps disentangle claims about referential success and continuity in the scientific realism 
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debate by making perspicuous which concepts are best equipped to evaluate the realist’s 
epistemic claims against the historical record of science. 
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1
 Inductive inferences from approximate truth to referential success turn out to be erroneous less often than they do 
the other way around. Indeed, if the correspondence theory of truth is correct it seems that the correctness of 
inferences from approximate truth to referential success is guaranteed since truth (and presumably even approximate 
truth) presupposes referential success but not vice-versa. 
2
 In the early days of descriptivism reference was thought to be fixed by all and only those descriptions which 
analytically explicate the meaning of the referring term. Quine’s well-known critique of the analytic-synthetic 
distinction precipitated the emergence of forms of descriptivism that dropped the analytic explication requirement. In 
what follows, I only consider examples of non-analytic descriptivist theories. 
3
 Please note that definitions 1-6 do not discriminate between ordinary and scientific terms. 
4
 Henceforth, properties are construed broadly to include relations. 
5
 One need not assume that predicates refer directly to properties but can instead opt for the view that predicates refer 
to the set of all objects with a given property or even to each individual object in that set (Devitt 2003, 904). 
6
 Intuitions (a) and (b) are in fact logically equivalent. In a longer version of this paper I included the proof for this 
equivalence. 
7
 There are even stronger ways of reading intuition (a), i.e. taking the clause ‘requires that all our ideas about that 
thing hold’ to mean that all and only our ideas about that thing hold. 
8
 This intuition is logically independent from intuitions (d) and (e). 
9
 Kripke adopts the idea of borrowing a reference from Strawson (1959, 182). 
10
 For a congenial account see Schurz’s contribution to this issue of Synthese.  
11
 It may be that in practice theories are chosen first and intuitions are chosen as a consequence.  Where this happens 
it is difficult and perhaps impossible to maintain that the relevant intuitions are evidence for that theory.  
12
 Strictly speaking it does not matter to my argument whether there are many referential concepts or many different 
instantiations of the same concept so long as each instantiation is regulated by its own standards of correctness. 
13
 Some concepts, especially those in science and mathematics, are so technical, well-defined and accurate that after 
some point in time we may no longer need to consider variants of them. In such cases, we may still speak of 
monolithic concepts. 
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14
 Alexander and Weinberg (2007, 62-3), call the more radical experimental philosophers who want to restrict (partly 
or fully) the evidential use of intuitions ‘restrictionists’, and those who want to select intuitions on the basis of 
experimental results ‘proper foundationists’. 
15
 Polylithicity is sometimes considered as a limited-range fall-back position by non-experimental philosophers who 
are forced to accept the non-universality of intuitions in certain domains. To the best of my knowledge no account of 
reference proposed up to now is genuinely polylithic. Kitcher’s (1993) token-type account of reference comes closest.  
16
 Even though most discussed cases in the history of science involve the frequent use of t by a group of individuals 
to consistently identify an object or property, the definition is intentionally slack to allow cases where the term is 
infrequently used in that capacity. Ditto for all the definitions given below. 
17
 According to Aristotelian physics sublunar bodies like rocks tend to move towards the centre of the earth. Yet, the 
Aristotelian notion is also meant to explain phenomena related to rising objects, e.g. sublunar bodies like fire tend 
towards the heavens. This does not frustrate the Aristotelian expression’s successful reference(MN) to gravity 
because def. 7 is sufficiently weak so as to allow expressions to refer to disjoint sets of phenomena. 
18
 Carnot’s principle states that a heat engine operating between two reservoirs at different temperatures will have a 
maximum efficiency, i.e. given a certain input of heat there is a limit on how much of that heat can be converted into 
work. Indeed, it states that no actual engine can be perfectly efficient. That is achievable only by an ideal Carnot 
engine.  
19
 Refcont(TD)* allows t′ to inherit also false claims about a. Stronger formulations can be given which forbid this 
from happening.  
